

XO in the TOC and the commander forward at the critical spot on the battlefield can thus fight a synchronized battle. Since the XO has most of the battle staff in the TOC, he is the one who must ensure that the commander's intent is achieved — that synchronization has occurred.

If it sounds like we think this matrix development process, and the resultant wargaming, is a cure-all, we do not. To make it effective, we spent several months developing and refining the matrix and five months training in its use. (*AUTHOR'S NOTE: Major Steve Bourque translated an idea into the matrix. Captains Stewart Smith, Scott Rutter, and Pete Scheets and the rest of the brigade staff, under the direction of executive officer Lieutenant Colonel Don Schenk, contributed to making the matrix concept meaningful.*)

The next step in our learning process will be to make the matrix a living document. To do this, we will have to learn to do a better job of predicting where the battle will turn — when it will go in a direction we have not anticipated. We will then need to "cut" the matrix and start planning. Given

the size of the brigade staff, doing this while fighting the brigade fight will be difficult, but until we have tried we won't know whether we can do it. If we do master such a process, it will either supplement or replace the standard fragmentary order.

Meanwhile, we have tested this synchronization matrix process at the National Training Center and have found it effective. It is probably most effective at the NTC because of the doctrinal approaches the opposing force follows. Rarely has the staff failed at least to consider most OPFOR options. In each case where we determined the enemy's decision points, and therefore which course of action we would adopt if he made a certain decision, we found this method effective. We moved our forces on the basis of the time and distance factors and the decision points in the matrix, and these moves resulted from the fact that the enemy actually performed as we had templated and predicted.

Additionally, artillery was moved and sequences were fired entirely on the basis of the wargaming and the times entered on the synchronization matrix.

This was done along with closely coordinating our air support, attack helicopter, and electronic warfare assets. In several instances, the brigade was able to fight the deep fight and then reposition the artillery so that it was prepared for the close-in fight. The hand-off of the battle to the forward battalions also took place as planned and as depicted in the matrix.

Obviously, the key part of any battle is seizing or maintaining the momentum so as to destroy the enemy, and this process allows us to do that. It may not work for every unit, but we believe it is at least worthy of consideration.

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Individual Protection Kit

LIEUTENANT KEVIN M. WALKER

During a two-week training period in 1987, units of the 2d Battalion, 293d Infantry, Indiana Army National Guard, and the British 6th Battalion, Royal Anglican Regiment, Territorial Army, conducted an exchange program to promote inter-allied cooperation and understanding.


A reinforced British company plus scout (recce) platoon was sent to a U.S. reserve forces training area in Indiana,

while one rifle company of the National Guard battalion was sent to the United Kingdom. The exchanged units replaced each other in their parent battalions, assuming control of the units' organic equipment and weapons. The men of each company retained their individual organizational item issues ("TA-50" in U.S. jargon).

One item of British equipment that gained our interest was the KIP (kit,

individual protection), a lightweight support system for providing overhead cover for an individual fighting position. The kit enables a British soldier to erect effective overhead cover rapidly without logs or engineer support, and in less time. It comes sealed in a pouch smaller than an MRE (meal, ready to eat) and is issued on the basis of one per man.

With the present emphasis on light, mobile, self-sustaining units, the intro-



duction of the KIP or a modified version of it into our Army would give U.S. infantrymen increased protection with an almost negligible increase in their fighting loads.

The KIP is composed of a strong lightweight tarpaulin, six hollow alloy stakes, and a nylon suspension cord.

These three items are issued in a double-wrapped plastic pouch that measures 13½ by 5 by 8 inches and weighs 1 pound 15 ounces. The kit is emplaced over a fighting position and backfilled to form a hump on the ground.

Installation is fast and simple:

- Drive stakes into the berm on each

side of a fighting position (along the position's long axis).

- Lace the suspension cord through the stakes and secure with the cord pulled taut.

- Place the tarp over the suspension system allowing the tarp's front edge to be tucked under.

- Backfill around the edges of the tarp to a depth of 18 inches.

- Backfill to cover the remaining tarp to a compacted depth of 18 inches.

Two men act as a team to build either a single or a double cover. A trained and experienced team can emplace a cover over a two-man fighting position in 15 to 20 minutes. (The accompanying sketch, taken from the British kit, shows dimensions and instructions for installing a double shelter.) The kit can also be used for a shelter, a litter, or a protective covering.

The KIP would offer the following advantages over our current system:

- Decrease the time needed to emplace overhead cover.

- Decrease logistical and engineer support requirements, freeing the engineers to perform mobility, counter-mobility, and other higher priority missions.

- Eliminate the need for logs and timbers as a key element of overhead cover, especially during operations in the desert or tundra where the procurement and transportation of such materials would strain an already overburdened logistical support system.

We now have a real need for a system such as this, and its benefits would far outweigh the relatively minor cost of procuring it. Available, off-the-shelf or readily modifiable low technology can save lives, too!

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